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Abstract
We develop and test a novel prediction of the theory of collusion over the business
cycle. Building on Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991), we present a model of collusive
behaviour in the presence of persistent demand and an Antitrust Authority (AA) in
a Cournot framework. The level of collusion is higher during a boom relative to a
recession as collusion occurs more frequently when demand is increasing (entering into
a collusive arrangement is more profitable and deviating from an existing cartel is less
profitable). The model predicts that the number of discovered cartels and hence an-
titrust filings should be procyclical because the level of collusion is procyclical. Using
a unique data set of United States Antitrust filings, we present robust evidence con-
sistent with the model’s prediction. We find that antitrust filings are procyclical even
after controlling for AA’s monitoring intensity. The evidence suggests that procyclical
competition policies may be a cost minimizing solution to asymmetries in collusive
behaviour over the business cycle.
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1. Introduction
The incentives for firms to collude in imperfectly competitive markets—coordinating their
behaviour to attain profits higher than the uncoordinated level—depend on the state of the
business cycle. This insight underlies the theory of collusion over the business cycle and
was first studied by Rotemberg and Saloner (1986). Their framework showed that collusion
among firms is more difficult to sustain during a boom when demand is high because of
a heightened desire to cheat from the mutual understanding. Haltiwanger and Harrington
(1991) (HH), however, showed that when demand is persistent, as observed over the business
cycle, the losses from the forgone collusive profits in the immediate future rise enough to
sustain a higher level of collusion during an expansion.1 Whether collusion is more pervasive
during expansions or recessions is an empirical question and has implications for competition
policy.
In this paper, we develop and test a novel prediction of the theory of collusion over the
business cycle.2 We first present a model that introduces two modifications to HH. First, we
consider Cournot competition to allow the possibility of cyclical variations in the Nash equi-
librium payoffs. These cyclical variations can play a potentially important role in the gains
from colluding and losses from defection over the business cycle.3 Second, we consider an
Antitrust Authority (AA) that conducts monitoring and implements a randomly generated
amercement (fine). This simple and tractable way of introducing competition policy allows
us to model the probability that a new cartel forms and the probability that an existing
cartel dissolves. We can, then, infer how the expected number of cartels varies over the
business cycle and formulate our empirical hypothesis: the frequency of discovered cartels is
procyclical.
Our model demonstrates that, in the presence of an AA, collusion occurs more frequently
1Kandori (1991) shows that, under special conditions, the Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) finding continues
to hold even when demand is serially correlated. Bagwell and Staiger (1997) consider a Markov demand
structure in a similar framework. Fabra (2006) allows for the possibility of capacity constraints. Knittel and
Lepore (2010) also consider a model with capacity constraints. Focusing on prices, they find that two types
of price wars exist; mixed strategy price wars, and counter cyclical collusive pricing.
2See Joseph E. Harrington (2017) for an excellent review of the theory of collusion and competition policy.
3Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) show that Cournot competition can overturn their main result based on
Bertrand competion even for i.i.d. demand, when firms face non-linear demand and/or increasing marginal
costs.
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in an expansion relative to a contraction. We show that there are two forces driving the
level of collusion. First, entering into a collusive arrangement is more profitable in an ex-
pansion. Second, deviating from an existing cartel is less profitable in an expansion. Both
of these forces work in tandem, thus, raising the overall level of collusion in an expansion.
Since collusion is procyclical, it follows that the number of discovered cartels should also be
procyclical, after controlling for the AA’s monitoring intensity.
It is, in general, difficult to detect collusive behaviour. The previous empirical literature has
examined evidence of price wars during recessions, price cycles and countercyclical ratio of
prices-to-measure marginal cost to assess the presence of collusion, among other strategies
(see, for example, Aguirregabiria and Slade (2017), for a detailed overview of the empirical
literature). A strand of empirical literature employs duration models to understand how
business cycle fluctuations impact cartel duration. Most closely related to our study is the
work of Garc´ıa Galindo et al. (2017). Using a dataset of EU cartel formations and breakups,
the authors find that both cartel formation and dissolution are procyclical. This would
suggest that cartel turnover is greater when the economy is expanding. Using a hidden
Markov model, research by Hyytinen et al. (2018) show that during the period 1951-1990,
the probability of forming a cartel and continuing a cartel in the Finnish manufacturing
industry is positively correlated with positive GDP shocks. Other related work includes;
Suslow (2005) which show that cartel duration is negatively correlated with uncertainty,
Levenstein and Suslow (2011) find that firm-specific discount rates are connected with cartel
duration, and Levenstein and Suslow (2016) show that the duration of US cartels responds
negatively to real interest rates.
Our research departs from the previous empirical literature in that we provide evidence based
on the aggregate US Department of Justice AA filings reflecting discovered cartels between
1970 and 2016. To the best of our knowledge, so far this data has not been brought to bear in
an empirical analysis of the cyclicality of collusion. Our main focus is to understand how the
cyclical variation in AA filings relates to the business cycle. While there are many available
measures of the cycle, our baseline measure is the cyclicality in aggregate US corporate
profits to GDP ratio as a proxy for demand facing the imperfectly competitive sector of the
economy. Once we account for the variation in fillings that are a result of actions by the AA,
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for example, monitoring intensity and the revised corporate leniency program, the remaining
variation within AA filings is attributed to the presence of collusion in the economy.
Our empirical analysis shows evidence that there are more AA filings during an expansion.
Using the negative binomial count regression model, we find that a 1 percent increase in
corporate profits over GDP will lead to a 6 percent increase in AA filings. This accounts for
the AA’s monitoring intensity and the US corporate leniency program. This empirical finding
is robust when we consider NBER cycle dates as our measure of the business cycle. This
finding has important policy implications for the AA. Specifically, procyclical monitoring
policies may be a cost minimizing strategy for the AA.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical model, Section 3 tests our
hypothesis empirically, and Section 4 concludes the paper. Proofs of the theoretical results
are provided in Appendix A. In Appendix B, we present a detailed description of our data
collection methodology. In Appendix C, we provide much of the derivations that appear
within the body of the text. Appendix D contains additional regression tables. Appendix
E contains additional tables and figures. Finally, Appendix F contains the details of our
simulation analysis.
2. Theoretical Model
Our model is a variant of Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) with two modifications. First,
we consider Cournot competition among firms instead of Betrand. Second, we introduce
AA in the model. There are N firms producing a homogenous product that compete by
simultaneously setting their level of output. To simplify the analysis, we assume that market
demand is linear and takes the following form:
Q(P ; t) = a(t)− bP, where: a(t) > 0 ∀t, b > 0 (1)
where a(t) is a deterministic and periodic demand shifter pushing demand outward when the
economy is expanding and inwards when the economy is contracting.4 We set the expansion–
contraction cycle to a length of t (the period of a(t)). Demand is realized in discrete time
4Going forward we assume that b = 1.
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and we express the demand function as:
Q(P ; t) =

a(1)− P if t ∈ {1, t+ 1, 2t+ 1, . . . }
a(2)− P if t ∈ {2, t+ 2, 2t+ 2, . . . }
...
a(t)− P if t ∈ {t, 2t, 3t, . . . }
(2)
Assumption 1. There exists a tˆ such that a(tˆ) > a(t) ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , t} \ {tˆ}.
Assumption 2. a(1) < a(2) < · · · < a(tˆ) > a(tˆ + 1) > · · · > a(t¯) > a(1). Note that
a(1) = a(it¯+ 1) ∀i = 0, 1, 2, ...
Assumption 1 guarantees the existence of a unique maximum of a(t) when t = tˆ. Assumption
2 formally characterizes the shape of the demand shifter. During each cycle, the demand
shifter a(t) is increasing for all t ∈ (it+ 1, (i+ 1)tˆ) ∀i = 0, 1, 2, ..., and decreasing for all
t ∈ ((i+ 1)tˆ, (i+ 1)t+ 1) ∀i = 0, 1, 2, .... Applying Assumption 2 to the definition of the
demand function, we arrive at Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. Q(P ; 1) < Q(P ; 2) < · · · < Q(P ; tˆ) > Q(P ; tˆ+ 1) > · · · > Q(P ; t) > Q(P ; 1)
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 1 characterizes the business cycle. At any point in time when demand is increasing,
we refer to as an expansion and when demand is decreasing, we refer to as a contraction.
With the demand structure defined, we proceed to show that collusion occurs more frequently
in an expansion rather than a contraction, all else being equal.
2.1. Cournot Nash Equilibrium
We assume all firms are symmetric and have the same linear cost function C(qi) = cqi.
The marginal cost c is set such that a(t) ≥ c ∀t. Firms maximize profits by independently
choosing their level of output qi. The total level of output is Q =
∑N
i=1 qi. The profit
maximization problem for each firm is characterized as follows:
piNi (t) = max
qi
P (Q; t)qi − C(qi) = (a(t)− c)
2
(N + 1)2
(3)
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Equation (3) is the standard Cournot equilibrium with N firms. Since a(t) ≥ c ∀t, the
equilibrium level of profits follow the same cyclical pattern as a(t). Thus, when the econ-
omy is expanding, competitive profits are increasing. In contrast, competitive profits are
decreasing when the economy is contracting. Since firms make decisions based on all future
profit streams, let V Ni (t) represent the present value of all future profit streams when firms
commit to competition in period t. If firms discount future periods by factor δ, the value
from competing in all future periods is expressed as follows:
V Ni (t) =
∞∑
j=0
δjpiNi (t+ j) = pi
N
i (t) +
1
1− δt¯
[
δpiNi (t+ 1) + · · ·+ δtpiNi (t)
]
(4)
From (4), we observe that value depends on profits in period t and the discounted sum of
all future cyclical profit streams.
2.2. Collusive Equilibrium
In addition to the competitive equilibrium, firms may decide to coordinate output and form
a cartel. To coordinate collusion in equilibrium, all firms within the market must agree
to join the cartel. In our model, we assume that there is an AA that investigates and
prosecutes cartels. We assume that within any period, the AA can open an investigation
into a specific market with probability α. Once an investigation has been opened, if the
AA collects incriminating evidence, they can proceed to trial. The strength of the evidence
is exogenous with a probability of successful conviction equal to ρ. The level of α and ρ
are fixed over the business cycle. If a successful conviction occurs, each firm in the cartel
must pay a fine F . This fine is exogenously determined at the beginning of the period and
depends on various factors, for example; legal precedent and political influence. From the
perspective of the firm, the fine appears random and we assume it follows an unspecified
probability distribution over the support
[
0, F¯
]
.
The cartel acts as a single firm and maximizes total profits by choice of market output Q.
Total profits are divided among the N firms equally. Each firm’s profit function, piMi (t),
(where M denotes the collusive monopoly case) is as follows:
piMi (t) =
1
N
(
max
Q
P (Q; t)Q− C(Q)
)
=
(a(t)− c)2
4N
(5)
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Equation (5) is the standard monopoly result with linear demand. Since firms have formed
a cartel, there is a probability that they will be detected and successfully convicted by the
AA. The expected fine faced by each firm in the cartel in period t is αρF . As such, we can
characterize the present value of collusion as follows:
V Mi (t) = pi
M
i (t) + αρ
(
δV M(t+ 1)− F)+ (1− αρ)δV Mi (t+ 1)
= piMi (t) +
1
1− δt
[
δpiMi (t+ 1) + · · ·+ δtpiMi (t)
]
− αρF
1− δ
(6)
To keep the model tractable, we assume that the AA does not monitor cartels post pros-
ecution. The implication of this assumption is that once detected, firms will continue to
collude in the future. The cartel views the fine as a cost of doing business. Thus, the present
value expected losses from joining the cartel is the same irrespective of t. This is reflected
in Equation (6).
Once a cartel has been formed, firms can deviate from the production plan. By doing so,
the defecting firm will achieve a competitive advantage leading to a higher level of profits.
However, once defection has occurred, firms will revert to producing at the Nash level of
quantity in all future periods as a punishment strategy. If a firm decides to defect from a
collusive arrangement, it solves the following maximization problem to realize profits piDi (t)
(where the D denotes defection):
piDi (t) = max
qi
P (qi + (N − 1)qM ; t)qi − C(qi) = (a(t)− c)
2(N + 1)2
16N2
(7)
The present value of defecting from the collusive arrangement in period t is characterized as
follows:
V D(t) = piDi (t)− αρF + δ
∞∑
i=0
δipiNi (t+ 1 + i)
= piDi (t)− αρF +
1
1− δt
[
δpiNi (t+ 1) + · · ·+ δtpiNi (t)
] (8)
We can combine the results of Equations (3), (5), and (7) into the following Lemmas:
Lemma 2. piDi (t) > pi
M
i (t) > pi
N
i (t), ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , t}
Proof. See Appendix.
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Lemma 3. piji (1) < pi
j
i (2) < · · · < piji (tˆ) > piji (tˆ+ 1) > · · · > piji (t) > piji (1) ∀j ∈ {M,N,D}
Proof. See Appendix.
We have shown that profits are cyclical, profits from defection are greater than monopoly
profits, and collusive profits are greater than competitive profits. We now characterize how
profits from defection, collusion, and competition change relative to one another over the
business cycle.
2.3. Collusion Over the Business Cycle
We start by defining the function ∆i(t) as the one-shot gain from collusion in period t and
Gi(t) to be the one-shot gain from defection in period t:
∆i(t) = pi
M
i (t)− piNi (t) =
(a(t)− c)2(N − 1)2
4N(N + 1)2
> 0, ∀N > 1 (9)
Gi(t) = pi
D
i (t)− piMi (t) =
(a(t)− c)2(N − 1)2
16N2
> 0, ∀N > 1 (10)
The one-shot gain from defection and the one-shot gain from collusion track the business
cycle. Formally:
Lemma 4. ∆i(1) < ∆i(2) < · · · < ∆i(tˆ) > ∆i(tˆ + 1) > · · · > ∆i(t) > ∆i(1) and
Gi(1) < Gi(2) < · · · < Gi(tˆ) > Gi(tˆ+ 1) > · · · > Gi(t) > Gi(1).
Proof. See Appendix.
2.3.1. Markets with No Collusion
Suppose there areM identical markets where collusion is not present.5 Let t′ and t′′ be such
that t′ < tˆ < t′′ and Q(P ; t′) = Q(P ; t′′). Since t′ is an expansionary period, and t′′ is a
contractionary period, the value gained from colluding is greater in an expansion relative to
a contraction.
Theorem 1. V Mi (t
′)−V Ni (t′) > V Mi (t′′)−V Ni (t′′) ∀ t′ < tˆ < t′′ such that Q(P ; t′) = Q(P ; t′′).
5Identical markets are markets that share the same demand function and have the same marginal cost.
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Proof. See Appendix.
Theorem 1 says that when the economy is expanding, all else equal, the gain from forming
a cartel is greater in an expansion when compared to a contraction. It is, however, possible
that the fine is set in a way such that V Mi (t
′)−V Ni (t′) < 0 at some t′. In this case, although
the value from colluding in an expansion is still greater, firms will not collude because doing
so leads to a loss. The implication of Theorem 1 is that when V Mi (t
′) − V Ni (t′) > 0 we
expect more markets to form cartels in an expansion. Although the single period gain from
collusion is the same in both the expansion and the contraction, firms that begin colluding
when the economy is doing well take advantage of growth in the gains from collusion. There
are increasing gains from collusion in an expansion and decreasing gains from collusion in a
contraction.
Since monitoring is not available to the AA, the present value of the expected fine from
colluding is the same in both an expansion and a contraction. If monitoring was available,
the firm would also face foregone collusive profits from being detected. In other words, the
expected cost of being detected in an expansion exceeds the expected cost of being detected
in a contraction. This result complicates the analysis and severely limits tractability.
We now frame our analysis in terms of the critical fine, Fˆ , which can prompt the formation
of a cartel. For any F < Fˆ cartel formation is profitable. To determine Fˆ , we solve the
following equation:
V Mi (t)− V Ni (t) = 0 (11)
to get:
Fˆ (α, ρ, δ, t) =
1− δ
αρ(1− δt) [∆i(t) + · · ·+ δ
t−1∆i(t− 1)] (12)
Lemma 5. Fˆ (α, ρ, δ, t′) > Fˆ (α, ρ, δ, t′′) ∀ t′ < tˆ < t′′ such that Q(P ; t′) = Q(P ; t′′)
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 5 says that the critical value of the fine is greater in an expansion relative to a
contraction. Since F is random, the probability that a cartel forms in an expansion is
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greater than in a contraction. We assume that the fine imposed by the AA is described
by a cumulative density function (CDF) H(·) over the support [0, F¯ ], where F¯ is the max-
imum fine allowed by law. The probability that a market forms a cartel in period t is
H
(
Fˆ (α, ρ, δ, t)
)
= P(F ≤ Fˆ (α, ρ, δ, t)).
Theorem 2. H
(
Fˆ (α, ρ, δ, t′)
)
> H
(
Fˆ (α, ρ, δ, t′′)
)
∀ t′ < tˆ < t′′ such that Q(P ; t′) =
Q(P ; t′′).
Proof. See Appendix.
Theorem (2) says that the probability of a market forming a cartel is greater in an expansion
relative to a contraction. If we assume there areM identical markets without collusion, the
expected number of markets that begin colluding at time t is:
M ·H
(
Fˆ (α, ρ, δ, t)
)
(13)
Lemma 6. M ·H
(
Fˆ (α, ρ, δ, t′)
)
>M ·H
(
Fˆ (α, ρ, δ, t′′)
)
.
Lemma 6 says that the expected number of markets that begin colluding is greater in an
expansion since the value gained from forming a cartel is greater in an expansion relative
to a contraction. We would, therefore, expect more markets to begin colluding when the
economy is expanding.
2.3.2. Industries with Collusion
We define the present value of all future losses from defecting in period t as:
L(t, δ) =
∞∑
s=0
δst¯[δ∆i(t+ 1) + · · ·+ δt¯∆i(t)] = 1
1− δt¯ [δ∆i(t
′ + 1) + · · ·+ δt¯∆i(t)] (14)
We can therefore represent the present value gained from defecting in period t as V Di (t) −
V Mi (t) = G(t) − αρF − L(t, δ). We now show that the gain from defecting is lower in an
expansion versus a contraction.
Theorem 3. V Di (t
′′)−V Mi (t′′) > V Di (t′)−V Mi (t′) ∀ t′ < tˆ < t′′ such that Q(P ; t′) = Q(P ; t′′).
See Theorem 4 and 7 in Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991).
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Proof. See Appendix.
Theorem 3 states that, all else being equal, the gain from deviation in an expansion is smaller
relative to a contraction because firms forgo high collusive profits in the immediate future.
This makes deviations less profitable for firms. Since fewer firms deviate in an expansion
there is a higher degree of collusion. Another way to frame this analysis is to determine the
critical fine, F˜ , such that any fine above this critical value will prompt firms to defect from
the cartel. We solve the following equation for F˜ :
V Di (t)− V Mi (t) = 0 (15)
to get:
F˜ (α, ρ, δ, t) =
1− δ
αρδ
[G(t)− L(t)] (16)
Lemma 7. F˜ (α, ρ, δ, t′) > F˜ (α, ρ, δ, t′′) ∀ t′ < tˆ < t′′ such that Q(P ; t′) = Q(P ; t′′).
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 7 says that the maximum fine required to sustain a cartel is greater in an expansion.
The probability that F > F˜ is larger in a contraction. We would, therefore, expect to see
more defection in a contraction. The probability that a collusive market will continue to
collude at period t is H
(
F˜ (α, ρ, δ, t)
)
= P(F ≤ F˜ (α, ρ, δ, t)). The probability that a firm
defects within a given market is 1−H
(
F˜ (α, ρ, δ, t)
)
.
Theorem 4. 1−H
(
F˜ (α, ρ, δ, t′)
)
< 1−H
(
F˜ (α, ρ, δ, t′′)
)
∀ t′ < tˆ < t′′ such that Q(P ; t′) =
Q(P ; t′′)
Proof. See Appendix.
From Theorem 4 we conclude that the probability of defection for a firm is lower in an
expansion relative to a contraction. If we assume that an economy has K identical collusive
markets, the expected number of collusive markets that collapse is:
K · [1−H (F (α, ρ, δ, t))] (17)
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As a result of Theorem 4, we have the lemma:
Lemma 8. K · [1−H (F (α, ρ, δ, t′))] < K · [1−H (F (α, ρ, δ, t′′))].
Lemma 4 says that the expected number of collusive markets that collapse in an expansion
is less relative to a contraction.
Theorem (2) and (4) imply that when the economy is expanding, we should expect more
cartels to form and fewer to defect, all else being equal. The level of collusive behavior is
procyclical. Suppose that at a specific point in time there are K collusive markets and M
competitive markets. We assume that M and K are fixed. We consider what happens to the
stock of collusive industries given periods t′ and t′′ such that Q(P ; t′) = Q(P ; t′′). We assume
that t′ represents a period in an expansion while t′′ represents a period in a contraction. We
let S(t) represent the expected stock of cartels in period t. The expected stock of cartels
is:
S(t) = K +M ·H
(
Fˆ (α, ρ, δ, t)
)
−K ·
[
1−H
(
F˜ (α, ρ, δ, t)
)]
(18)
From Lemma (6) and (8) we see that:
M ·H
(
Fˆ (α, ρ, δ, t′)
)
> M ·H
(
Fˆ (α, ρ, δ, t′′)
)
−K ·
[
1−H
(
F˜ (α, ρ, δ, t′)
)]
> −K ·
[
1−H
(
F˜ (α, ρ, δ, t′′)
)] (19)
If we add both sides of the inequality in (19) and add K to both sides we get:
K +M ·H
(
Fˆ (α, ρ, δ, t′)
)
−K ·
[
1−H
(
F˜ (α, ρ, δ, t′)
)]
>
K +M ·H
(
Fˆ (α, ρ, δ, t′′)
)
−K ·
[
1−H
(
F˜ (α, ρ, δ, t′′)
)] (20)
Using the definition of the expected stock of cartels:
S(t′) > S(t′′) (21)
Thus, the expected stock of cartels is greater in the expansion relative to the contraction
given a contraction and an expansion with identical demand. Since the AA will open an
investigation with probability α, the expected number of investigations is:
αS(t′) > αS(t′′) (22)
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From Equation (22) we conclude that the expected number of antitrust filings will be greater
in an expansion versus a contraction. The difference in filings between the two periods is
driven by the overall stock of collusive behavior in each period. This result provides the
basis for testing how corporate profits impacts the number of AA filings over the expansion
and contraction phases of the business cycle.
2.4. Model Simulation
To help illustrate our findings, we assume a specific functional form of the demand shifter.
We consider a parameterized version of the simple sine function to capture the cyclical nature
of the business cycle as follows.
a(t) = d
(
v
d
+ sin
(
(2pi)t
t¯
− pi(t¯+ 4)
2t¯
))
(23)
The shape of the function is defined by three parameters; d, v, and t¯. They determine the
the peak level of demand, length of the cycle, and the trough level of demand, respectively.
The maximum value of the function is equal to v + d, while the minimum value is v − d.
We assume that v ≥ d. The length of the cycle is defined by t¯. Note that the second term
in the sine function, pi(t¯+4)
2t¯
, is an offset so the cycle starts at the minimum level of demand.
We can simplify Equation (23) as follows;
a(t) = v − d cos
(
2pi(t− 1)
t¯
)
(24)
Since the magnitude of a(t) is unimportant, we assume that v = d = 1 to get:
a(t) = 1− cos
(
2pi(t− 1)
t¯
)
(25)
We know that a(t) ≥ c, to simplify our analysis we let c = 0. Thus, the demand function
becomes:
Q(P ; t) =
(
1− cos
(
2pi(t− 1)
t¯
))
− P (26)
We calibrate the parameters based on aggregate US data. We assume that each period t
represents a quarter. Based on the NBER data, the average length of the business cycle,
trough to trough, is 19 quarters, thus we set t¯ = 19. To impute the discount factor, we use
a real interest rate of r = 0.023, corresponding to the 2016 value for the US. The implied
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discount factor is δ = 0.98. We also assume that the number of firms in a market is set
exogenously, we arbitrarily use N = 8. Using 2017 antitrust data, we calculate the percent
of 4-digit NAICS codes under investigation. This number is approximately 2% and we set
α = 0.02. Finally, according to Warin et al. (2006), between 1996 and 2005, the antitrust
conviction rates hovered around 50%. Thus, we set ρ = 0.50.
Table 1: Parameter Assumptions
Parameter Interpretation Value Source
t¯ Business Cycle Length (Quarters) 19 NBER Cycles
δ Discount Factor (Real Interest Rate) 0.98 World Bank
α Rate of Investigations 0.02 US DOJ Antitrust
ρ Probability of Prosecution 0.50 American Bar Association
N Market Size 8 Arbitrary
Figure 1a shows the values of F such that V Mi (t) ≥ V Ni (t). The solid black line represents
Fˆ . The area below the curve represents the values of Fˆ such that firms will form a cartel.
Figure 1b shows the values of Fˆ for both a contraction and an expansion such that demand is
equal. The upper axis shows the contractionary periods that map to the lower axis which are
expansionary periods. The mapping is based on periods with equal demand. The probability
that F is below Fˆ is larger in an expansion compared to a contraction. This shows that it
is easier to form a cartel in an expansion. Figure 1c and Figure 1d are for existing cartels
where the solid black like represents F˜ . From Figure 1d, we see that the probability that F is
below F˜ is larger in an expansion compared to a contraction. In other words, the probability
that a cartel collapses is larger in a contraction versus an expansion. We conclude that in
an expansion more firms join cartels and fewer cartels collapse.
2.5. The Optimality of Procyclical Antitrust Policy
According the model, there is a greater level of collusive behavior when the economy is
expanding versus when the economy is contracting. What implication does this have for
the AA? We assume that the goal of the AA is to maximize the overall expected number of
convictions. Consider a simple two-period model and assume that the AA has a finite budget
13
Figure 1: Various Levels of F over the Cycle that Trigger Collusion and Defection
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to be allocated across two periods. The size of the budget in each period influences the AA’s
capacity to take on investigations (i.e., the probability of opening an investigation). Let Wt
represent the budget in period t and W¯ represent the total budget to be allocated over two
periods. The probability of an investigation takes the following functional form capturing
the dependency on the budget size:
0 ≤ α (Wt) ≤ 1 and α (0) = 0, α′ (Wt) > 0, α′′ (Wt) < 0 (27)
The property α′ (·) > 0 captures the notion that an increase in the budget increases the
capacity to take on new investigations and hence the number of investigations increases.
The property α′′ (·) < 0 captures the notion that each additional dollar allocated towards
an investigation has diminishing returns. As officers divide their time across an increasing
number of investigations, their marginal productivity decreases. We make the following
assumption on the form of (27);
α (Wt) = 1− exp(−aWt) (28)
This convenient function satisfies all the properties. We include the parameter a > 0 which
measures the rate at which the function approaches the horizontal asymptote of 1. The
budget constraint of the AA is:
W1 +W2 ≤ W¯ (29)
We let Mt represent the number of cartels in period t. We assume that M1 > M2, which
according to our model means that period 1 is an expansion and period 2 is a contraction. As
the parameter a increases, the marginal benefit of allocating additional dollars to investiga-
tions increases. The objective of the AA is to maximize the expected number of prosecuted
cartels as follows:
max
W1,W2
α (W1) ρM1 + α (W2) ρM2 s.t W1 +W2 ≤ W¯ (30)
The constraint is binding since α′(·) > 0. The first order necessary conditions (FONCs)
are:
dα (W ∗1 )
dW1
M1 +
dα (W2(W
∗
1 ))
dW1
dW2
dW1
M2 = 0 (31)
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Using the functional form for α(·) we get:
exp(−aW ∗1 )M1 − exp(−a(W¯ −W ∗1 ))M2 = 0 (32)
Solving Equation (32);
W ∗i =
W¯
2
− 1
2a
log
(
Mj
Mi
)
(33)
Taking into consideration the boundary conditions, if M1 > M2:
W ∗1 = min
(
W¯ ,
W¯
2
+
1
2a
log
(
M1
M2
))
, W ∗2 = W¯ −W ∗1 (34)
From Equation (34) we see that if the level of collusion is the same in both periods, the
AA will split the budget equally across the two periods. However, based on the level of
collusion in each period, the AA will adjust their expenditures toward the period with more
cartels. As we can see, this adjustment is dampened by the parameter a > 0. In terms
of the theoretical model, the AA should impose a procyclical monitoring policy that would
allocate more resources to an expansion and less resources to a contraction.
3. Empirical Analysis
In this section, we test a key prediction of the model that collusion is more pervasive during
expansions relative to contractions. Specifically, based on the model, our hypothesis is as
follows:
Hypothesis: AA filings should be positively related with the business cycle after controlling
for AA’s monitoring intensity.
We divide our analysis into a brief discussion on the collection and compilation of the dataset
in Section 3.1, a discussion of our empirical methodology in Section 3.2, and a presentation
of our findings in Section 3.3.
3.1. Data Compilation and Description
We compile the data from four major sources, the largest of which spans the years 1903 to
2017. The four major components of our data are: the frequency of cases brought fourth by
the US Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division, corporate profits from the Federal
16
Economic Reserve Data (FRED) database, the Annual Appropriations of the DOJ Antitrust
Division, and the NBER Business Cycle Dates.
We compile the data on case frequency from publicly available information on the DOJ’s
online repository of antitrust cases dating back to 1941.6 The main page of the repository
contains a hyperlink for each case that has been filed. We developed a web scraper that
accesses each link and collects the following data: case open date, case name, case type, case
violation, market, industry code, and component. In total, 2079 cases were extracted.7 We
aggregate the filing frequencies every quarter. In Figure 2 we graph the top 12 antitrust
violations between 1941 and 2018.8 Note that these violations are not mutually exclusive as
filings may have multiple violations associated with them. A good example is U.S. V. James
P. Heffernan (Steel Drums). The defendant was charged with horizontal price fixing and
mail fraud. The mail fraud charge comes as an indirect consequence of price fixing.
Figure 2: Frequency of Antitrust Filings by Type 1941-2018
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6See https://www.justice.gov/atr/antitrust-case-filings-alpha
7As of August 4th, 2018
8We have excluded cases that had an empty space as a violation. This could be an unintended effect of
the scrapping process. These accounted for 159 cases.
17
We observe that horizontal price fixing, bid rigging, horizontal market allocation, and other
restraints of trade constitute a large share of the antitrust workload. This is followed by
merger related filings (horizontal mergers and Hart-Scott-Rodino filings). In terms of other
violations, we observe that conspiracy to commit mail fraud, conspiracy to defraud US, tax
evasion, and wire fraud typical co-occur with other legal challenges like price fixing and bid
rigging.
In the pre-1970 sample, there are only 20 cases over a 29 year period, on average, less than
one case per quarter. This may signal one of two things; first, the competition landscape may
have been fundamentally different. For example, enforcement of price fixing may not have
been a priority. Second, there may be cases missing from the DOJ website. We, therefore,
truncate our sample at 1970. Figure 3 shows the frequency of collusion related filings with
the associated frequencies in Table 7 (Appendix E).
Figure 3: Frequency of Antitrust Filings (Collusion Related) 1970-2016 (Annual)
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There are two important observations to note. First, the average level of filings jumps in
1993. This corresponds to the exact year that the US DOJ implemented its revised leniency
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program.9 As expected, there is an increase in the average number of filings post revised
leniency program. Second, in most cases, there appears to be a decline in filings either
during or after a recession. This may indicate that the level of collusion during a recession
is relatively low, a pattern consistent with the prediction of the model. In addition to the
filing frequency over time, it is helpful to look at the distribution of filing frequency. Figures
4 and 5 show the kernel density plots for all filings and collusion related filings.
Figure 4: Kernel Density - All
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We observe that filing frequency is skewed to the right. Most of the time, the number of
filings per quarter is localized around zero. Given that our dependent variable is a count
and that the data is right skewed, the application of a count regression model (Poisson or
negative binomial) will allow us to deal with the non-normality of the OLS errors and force
predicted values to be non-negative.
We collect the Appropriations figures for the DOJ Antitrust Division from the “Antitrust Di-
vision Appropriation Figures Since Fiscal Year 1903” data set on the Data.gov repository.10
Appropriations have been recorded on an annual basis from 1903 to 2016. To account for
inflationary pressures on appropriations, we adjust using the GDP deflator. Since the ap-
propriations data is recorded annually, we disaggregate by weighting the annual total across
each quarter using total government expenditures from FRED. For each year from 1960 to
2016 we calculate the % of total expenditures that were incurred each quarter and apply
them to the annual appropriations. Figure 6 shows the annual appropriations data.
9See https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/810281/download
10See https://www.justice.gov/atr/appropriation-figures-antitrust-division
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Figure 6: Quarterly Real Budget Appropriations 1970-2016 ($M - 2010)
10
20
30
40
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Year
R
ea
l
A
p
p
ro
p
ri
at
io
n
s
[$
M
]
Recession Appropriations
We use the after tax corporate profits-to-GDP ratio (excluding inventory valuation adjust-
ment and capital consumption adjustment), as a proxy for the business cycle. Since the
theory suggests that firm profits drive the decision to collude, looking at aggregate corpo-
rate profits provides us with a measure of the business cycle that links directly to our model.
As a robustness check, we also estimate a model using the NBER cycle dates. Figure 7 shows
corporate profits along with the NBER cycle dates in gray.
Figure 7: Corporate Profits 1970-2016
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Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the data. Our findings show that there has been
on average 11 antitrust cases per quarter since 1970. Once we include only price fixing and
collusion filings, we find there were, on average, 6 filings per quarter. The average quarterly
real budget for the antitrust division is approximately $26M. Looking at real corporate
profits, the average level across the sample is 761B, or 7% of GDP.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics (1970-2016)
N Mean Median Sd
Filing Frequency 188 10.64 9.00 9.00
Filing Frequency (Collusion) 188 6.44 5.00 6.53
Filing Frequency (Mergers) 188 1.91 1.50 1.83
Real Budget Appropriations (M - 2010) 188 25.84 22.35 9.70
Real Corporate Profits (B - 2010) 188 761.46 550.53 478.74
Corporate Profits/GDP 182 6.86 6.41 2.01
Since the descriptive statistics can provide insights into the relationships between filing
frequency and various covariates, we also look at a variety of conditional statistics. Table 8
(Appendix E) presents the conditional descriptive statistics based on the recession indicator.
Most notably, on average, there is a higher level of total filings and collusion based filings
when the economy is in an expansion. Additionally, we see that mergers between the two
groups are about the same on average. We also observe that real corporate profits are
positively correlated with the business cycle.
We can gain some insight into how the introduction of the revised leniency program has
impacted filings by looking at how the average level of filings differs before and after its
introduction. Table 9 (Appendix E) provides these conditional statistics. There is a sharp
difference in the average level of filing before and after 1993. The total number of filings and
collusion based filing increased by a factor of 4 or greater. Mergers have not increased as
dramatically, which suggests that the increase in collusion related filing can be attributed to
the revised leniency program and not another institutional factor.
Finally, we look at the average level of filings over various levels of corporate profit rates.
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Table 3 provides these conditional statistics. We find that the overall level of filings and
collusion related filings are increasing in profitability relative to the state of the economy.
This evidence corroborates the hypothesis that there are more filings when the economy is
expanding.
Table 3: Conditional Descriptive Statistics (1970-2016)
N Mean Median Sd
Low Corporate Profits [3%,6%)
Filing Frequency 83 7.78 4.00 8.61
Filing Frequency (Collusion) 83 4.73 2.00 6.82
Filing Frequency (Mergers) 83 1.83 1.00 1.78
Mid Corporate Profits [6%,9%)
Filing Frequency 63 9.73 8.00 8.14
Filing Frequency (Collusion) 63 5.94 5.00 5.13
Filing Frequency (Mergers) 63 1.68 1.00 1.75
High Corporate Profits (9%,12%]
Filing Frequency 36 18.00 16.50 7.75
Filing Frequency (Collusion) 36 11.03 10.00 6.47
Filing Frequency (Mergers) 36 2.08 2.00 1.98
∗ During 1970-2015, the lowest CP/GDP was 3%, while the highest was 12%.
In the next section, we provide a brief introduction to the econometric methodology and a
detailed analysis of our results.
3.2. Methodology
The frequency of AA filings is a count variable. Because of this standard linear regression
models may not provide the best econometric fit. This is especially true if the data is right-
skewed. Looking at Figure 5, the frequency of AA filings is skewed to the right when we
consider both the collusion subset and the all filings case. We decide to estimate our model
using the Negative Binomial approach as per Cameron and Trivedi (2010). There are two
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main reasons for favoring this methodology. First, as we show in the results section11, our
data exhibits over-dispersion which cannot be controlled for by the standard Poisson model.
Second, we don’t believe that zero counts are generated by a distinct process, thus ruling
out zero-inflated models. We briefly cover the estimation procedure below.
Suppose the probability that a specific count occurs follows a Poisson distribution:
yt ∼ Poisson(vtµt) (35)
We describe µt as a function of regressors while vt is unobserved heterogeneity. Based on
the distribution of yt:
E[yt|Xt, vt] = vt exp (X ′tβ) (36)
yt has the following conditional PDF:
f(yt|Xt, vt) = exp(−vtµt)(vtµt)
yt
yt!
(37)
Next suppose that vt > 0, i.i.d, and follows a Gamma distribution:
vt ∼ Gamma(1/α, α) (38)
vt is characterized by the following PDF, where α is the scale parameter and 1/α is the shape
parameter:
g(vt) =
v
(1−α)/α
t exp(−vt/α)
Γ(1/α)α1/α
(39)
We note that the negative binomial regression arises as a Gamma-Poisson mixture
f(yt|Xt) =
∫ ∞
0
f(yt|Xt, vt)g(vt)dvt = Γ(1/α + yt)
Γ(yt + 1)Γ(1/α)
(
1
1 + αµt
)1/α(
αµt
1 + αµt
)yt
(40)
Based on this derivation the unconditional mean of the count variable is as follow:
E[yt|Xt] = exp(X ′tβ) (41)
In our case the observed heterogeneity takes the following form:
E[yt|Xt] = exp(α + β1CY CLEt + β2LENIENCYt + β3BUDGETt) (42)
11Evidenced by the significance of the α coefficient.
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CY CLEt represents corporate profits per GDP after tax (without IVA and CCAdj), LENIENCYt
represents the leniency indicator (t ≥ 1993), and BUDGETt is detrended real annual budget
appropriations. Going forward, all coefficients should be interpreted as either a unit change
in the log expected counts or partial elasticities (a unit change in the regressor leads to a
percent change in the count).
3.3. Results
In this section we present the results of our empirical estimation. We consider two specifi-
cations. In the first case we assume that the AA has a constant monitoring intensity over
the business cycle. In the second case we control for both the monitoring intensity and the
revised leniency program. These controls allow us to isolate the variation in investigations
due to factors not within the AAs control. According to our model, the source of this varia-
tion is the cyclical variation in the degree of overall collusion in the economy. Thus positive
correlation between corporate profits and AA filings would be evidence in favour procyclical
collusion.
Table 4: Negative Binomial Regression Results - Collusion Filings (1970-2016)
Dependent variable:
Frequency of Filings (Collusion)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CY CLE 0.174∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗ 0.061∗
(0.035) (0.035) (0.032) (0.033)
Detrended Budget (M - 2010) 0.057∗∗ 0.043∗∗
(0.022) (0.020)
Leniency 1.155∗∗∗ 1.149∗∗∗
(0.161) (0.160)
Constant 0.602∗∗ 0.677∗∗ 0.576∗∗ 0.655∗∗∗
(0.300) (0.293) (0.245) (0.247)
Observations 182 182 182 182
α (LR Test α = 0) 0.790∗∗∗ 0.772∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗ 0.484∗∗∗
Wald χ2 24.69∗∗∗ 33.55∗∗∗ 86.32∗∗∗ 90.56∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.021 0.025 0.078 0.082
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis.
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Using the negative binomial methodology, we employ maximum likelihood estimation to
estimate the model coefficients. This model implicitly assumes that the AA has a constant
monitoring intensity across the business cycle. The coefficient on CY CLE is 0.174 and
significant at the 1% level. This result corroborates our theory that the AA tends to have
more filings in an expansion rather than a contraction. Looking at all filings in Table 5
(Appendix D), we see that the sign and level of significance are similar.
We now control for time varying monitoring intensity. We use detrended real appropria-
tions as a proxy for monitoring intensity. As one would expect, detrended budget positively
impacts the number of AA filings. In the collusion filings case, an unanticipated real appro-
priations increase, on average, leads to an increase in AA filings. This result is significant at
the 5% level. The coefficient associated with CY CLE is 0.160, and is significant at the 1%
level. Even after controlling for monitoring intensity over the cycle, we still find investiga-
tions are positively correlated with expansions. This evidence supports the theory that the
increase in investigations during an expansion is associated with a higher degree of collusive
behaviour. The result in the all filings regression in Table 5 (Appendix D) is similar.
To account for the structural change in the data in 1993, we include an indicator for the
introduction of the revised leniency program. We find that the leniency dummy explains a
large portion of the variation in filings. The coefficient is positive and statistically significant
at the 1% level in all regressions. This is consistent with the US experience in that the
introduction of the revised leniency program lead to a proliferation in self-reporting. We see
that the coefficient associated with CY CLE is 0.061 and is statistically significant at the
10% level. The introduction of the corporate leniency program as a covariate has the effect
of reducing the explanatory power of CY CLE. Again, these results are both consistent with
the theory.
Finally, as a robustness check, we replace corporate profits with the NBER cycle dates in
Table 6 (Appendix D). We use a dummy to indicate an expansion. We find that the coefficient
associated with the expansion dummy is positive, however not statistically significant. The
sign supports our theory and the reduction in significance is likely due to a reduction in the
variation of the expansion dummy. When we collate our results, we find that the data is in
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favor of the argument that collusion is procyclical. That is to say, we should expect to find
more collusion when the economy is expanding.
4. Conclusion
We explored the impact that the business cycle has on collusive behavior in a Cournot
framework with an Antitrust Authority. We found that collusion is more prevalent when
the economy is expanding. There are two major explanations for this. First, we find that
in markets where there is no collusion, the per period gain from collusion is high in the
immediate future when compared to a similar period in a contraction. Second, in markets
where collusion is present, as in Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991), we find that the loss
from defection is high in the immediate future, this suggests that defection in an expansion
is costly. As a result, more cartels will form in an expansion relative to a contraction. In
addition, when the economy is expanding, fewer cartels will dissolve. This implies that the
overall level of collusion in the economy is procyclical. This leads to our hypothesis that AA
filings are procyclical.
We tested the prediction of the theory using a unique dataset of US antitrust filings. We find
that AA filings are procyclical. A 1 percent increase in corporate profits over GDP leads to a
6 percent increase in AA filings. This finding controls for the AA’s monitoring intensity and
the US corporate leniency program and is robust to different measures of the business cycle.
Our empirical findings suggest that procyclical monitoring policies may be the optimal cost
minimizing route for the allocation of the DOJ resources.
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A. Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Start by subtracting P from each side of the inequality in Assumption
2.
a(1)− P < a(2)− P < · · · < a(tˆ)− P > a(tˆ+ 1)− P > . . .
> a(t¯)− P > a(1)− P
(A–1)
Apply the definition of Q(P ; t) = a(t)− P ;
Q(P ; 1) < Q(P ; 2) < · · · < Q(P ; tˆ) > Q(P ; tˆ+ 1) > . . .
> Q(P ; t) > Q(P ; 1)
(A–2)
Proof of Lemma 2.
piMi (t)− piNi (t) =
(a(t)− c)2(N − 1)2
4N(N + 1)2
> 0, ∀N > 1 (A–3)
piDi (t)− piMi (t) =
(a(t)− c)2(N − 1)2
16N2
> 0, ∀N > 1 (A–4)
Using the two results above, we can easily see that piMi (t) > pi
N
i (t) and pi
D
i (t) > pi
M
i (t). Thus,
by transitivity, piDi (t) > pi
M
i (t) > pi
N
i (t).
Proof of Lemma 3. for j ∈ {N,M,D}, we know that piji (t) = fj(N)(a(t)−c)2 where fj(N) >
0 ∀N > 1. As such, piji (t) ∝ (a(t) − c)2. Since (a(t) − c) ≥ 0, and using the fact that
a(1) < a(2) < · · · < a(tˆ) > a(tˆ + 1) > · · · > a(t¯) > a(1), it must be the case that
(a(1)−c)2 < (a(2)−c)2 < · · · < (a(tˆ)−c)2 > (a(tˆ+1)−c)2 > · · · > (a(t¯)−c)2 > (a(1)−c)2.
Using the proportionality relationship, it must then be the case that piji (1) < pi
j
i (2) < · · · <
piji (tˆ) > pi
j
i (tˆ+ 1) > · · · > piji (t) > piji (1) ∀j ∈ {M,N,D}
Proof of Lemma 4. We know that ∆i(t) = f∆(N)(a(t) − c)2 and Gi(t) = fG(N)(a(t) − c)2
where f∆(N) > 0 and f∆(N) > 0 ∀N > 1. Therefore, we now that the following holds;
∆i(t) ∝ (a(t) − c)2 and Gi(t) ∝ (a(t) − c)2. The remainder of the proof follows the same
logic as the proof for Lemma 3. For brevity, we omit this.
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Proof of Theorem 1. See Theorem 4 and 7 in Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991). We would
like to show that V Mi (t
′)− V Ni (t′) > V Mi (t′′)− V Ni (t′′).
[V Mi (t
′)− V Ni (t′)]− [V Mi (t′′)− V Ni (t′′)] =
[∆i(t
′) + · · ·+ δt−1∆i(t′ − 1)]
1− δt −
[∆i(t
′′) + · · ·+ δt−1∆i(t′′ − 1)]
1− δt
(A–5)
Let’s assume that the first term is greater than the second term;
[∆i(t
′) + · · ·+ δt−1∆i(t′ − 1)]
1− δt >
[∆i(t
′′) + · · ·+ δt−1∆i(t′′ − 1)]
1− δt (A–6)
∆i(t
′) + · · ·+ δt−1∆i(t′ − 1) > ∆i(t′′) + · · ·+ δt−1∆i(t′′ − 1) (A–7)
Let’s define the following ;
A = ∆i(t
′) + · · ·+ δt′′−t′−1∆i(t′′ − 1)
B = ∆i(t
′′) + · · ·+ δt+t′−t′′−1∆i(t′ − 1)
(A–8)
We can express (A-7) as follows;
A+ δt
′′−t′B > B + δt+t
′−t′′A (A–9)
A
1− δt′′−t′ >
B
1− δt+t′−t′′ (A–10)
The left hand side is just the present value of the stream (∆i(t
′) + · · ·+ ∆i(t′′− 1)) repeated
every t′′ − t′ periods and the right hand side is just the stream (∆i(t′′) + · · · + ∆i(t′ − 1))
repeated every t+ t′ − t′′ periods. It must be the case that;
∆i(τ) ≥ ∆i(τ ′),∀τ ∈ {t′, t′ + 1, . . . , t′′ − 1},∀τ ′ ∈ {t′′, t′′ + 1, . . . , t′ − 1} (A–11)
To think about A–10 intuitively, the set {t′, t′ + 1, . . . , t′′ − 1} are all of the time periods
in the peak of a cycle during some period length t, while {t′′, t′′ + 1, . . . , t′ − 1} are all
of the time periods during the trough. Thus, it must be the case that any period from
{t′, t′ + 1, . . . , t′′ − 1} yields a higher gain than EVERY period from {t′′, t′′ + 1, . . . , t′ − 1}.
Therefore;
[∆i(t
′) + · · ·+ δt−1∆i(t′ − 1)]
1− δt >
[∆i(t
′′) + · · ·+ δt−1∆i(t′′ − 1)]
1− δt (A–12)
Therefore, V Mi (t
′)− V Ni (t′) > V Mi (t′′)− V Ni (t′′).
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Proof of Lemma 5. We need to show that Fˆ (α, ρ, δ, t′) > Fˆ (α, ρ, δ, t′′). From Theorem 1, we
showed that;
∆i(t
′) + · · ·+ δt−1∆i(t′ − 1) > ∆i(t′′) + · · ·+ δt−1∆i(t′′ − 1) (A–13)
We also know that;
Fˆ (α, ρ, δ, t) =
1− δ
αρ(1− δt) [∆i(t) + · · ·+ δ
t−1∆i(t− 1)] (A–14)
From (A–13) we can arrive at;
1− δ
αρ(1− δt)
[
∆i(t
′) + · · ·+ δt−1∆i(t′ − 1)
]
>
1− δ
αρ(1− δt)
[
∆i(t
′′) + · · ·+ δt−1∆i(t′′ − 1)
] (A–15)
And using the definition in (A–14);
Fˆ (α, ρ, δ, t′) > Fˆ (α, ρ, δ, t′′) (A–16)
Proof of Theorem 3. We know that G(t′′) = G(t′). We want to show that L(t′, δ)−G(t′) >
L(t′′, δ)− G(t′′). Since G(t′′) = G(t′), it remains to show that L(t′, δ) > L(t′′, δ). Using the
definition of L(t, δ);
1
1− δt¯ [δ∆i(t
′ + 1) + · · ·+ δt¯∆i(t′)] > 1
1− δt¯ [δ∆i(t
′′ + 1) + · · ·+ δt¯∆i(t′′)] (A–17)
Let’s define the following;
A = δ∆i(t
′ + 1) + · · ·+ δt′′−t′∆i(t′′) (A–18)
B = δ∆i(t
′′ + 1) + · · ·+ δt¯−t′′+t′∆i(t′) (A–19)
Using the definition of A and B;
A+ δt
′′−t′B > B + δt¯−t
′′+t′A (A–20)
A
1− δt′′−t′ >
B
1− δt¯−t′′+t′ (A–21)
Note that the left hand side is just the present value of (∆i(t
′ + 1), . . . ,∆i(t′′)) over the
interval t′′ − t′. The right hand side is the present value of (∆i(t′′ + 1), . . . ,∆i(t′)) over
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the interval t¯ − t′′ + t′. Each element in A dominates each element in B, that is to say
∆i(τ
′) ≥ ∆i(τ ′′) ∀ τ ′ ∈ {t′ + 1, . . . , t′′}, ∀τ ′′ ∈ {t′′ + 1, . . . , t′}. As is such, the left hand side
is greater than the right hand side which completes the proof, showing that;
L(t′, δ)−G(t′) > L(t′′, δ)−G(t′′) (A–22)
Proof of Lemma 7. From Theorem 3 we see that L(t′) − G(t′) > L(t′′) − G(t′′). It is also
true that;
δαρ
1− δ [L(t
′)−G(t′)] > δαρ
1− δ [L(t
′′)−G(t′′)] (A–23)
Now applying the definition of F˜ ;
F˜ (α, ρ, δ, t′) > F˜ (α, ρ, δ, t′′) (A–24)
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B. Data Collection
The US DOJ Antitrust Division lists all Antitrust case filings in alphabetical order on their
website. Cases appear as early as the 1940’s and as recent as 2017. Each case has a
hyperlink that directs the end user to general information about the case. Each case has
information on, among others: filing date, type, and type of violations. In addition to basic
descriptive information, the DOJ includes documents relevant to the case. Since there are
approximately 1900 cases, we needed to develop an efficient method of extracting the basic
descriptive information for each case. We proceeded by developing a web scrapper in R.
The alphabetical list on the DOJ website has a hyperlink associated with each filing. Upon
inspecting the web page, we found that the web address associated with each case is embed-
ded in the HTML code. We first used the “XML” package in R to parse the HTML document
associated with the alphabetical listing of Antitrust filings. We used “htmlTreeParse” to gen-
erate an R data structure that represents the HTML document. Once we created this data
structure, we searched this data structure for all “¡a¿” tags and extracted the corresponding
“href” elements. Since the resulting list contains all links within the HTML document, we
needed to differentiate links that correspond to a case and links that point elsewhere on the
DOJ website. We noticed that links associated with a particular case had the following string
within the link name “/atr/case”. Thus, we deleted all additional links that did not contain
“/atr/case”, which left us with only those links that map to specific cases. We were left with
a list of full links that corresponded to all Antitrust filings as listed on the alphabetical list
on the DOJ website.
Once we had the list of web links that corresponded to all antitrust cases listed on the DOJ
website, we used a loop to parse the HTML code on each web link. Using the web link
and identifying certain patterns within the HTML documents, we were able to extract the
following information: Case Open Date, Case Name, Case Type, Case Violation, Market,
Industry Code, and Component. After extracting a list of cases and their corresponding
dates, we counted the number of filings that occurred in a given quarter from 1970 to
2016.
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C. Supplementary Material
C.1. Nash Equilibrium
piNi (t) = max
qi
P (Q; t)qi − C(qi) = max
qi
(
a(t)−
N∑
i=1
qi
)
qi − cqi (C–25)
The First Order Necessary Condition;
a(t)−
N∑
i=1
qi − qi − c = 0 (C–26)
We assume symmetric firms (q = qi);
q =
a(t)− c
N + 1
(C–27)
The absolute margins is expressed as follows;
P − c = a(t)−Nq − c = a(t)− N
N + 1
(a(t)− c)− c = a(t)− c
N + 1
(C–28)
As such, the Nash profits are;
piNi (t) =
(a(t)− c)2
(N + 1)2
(C–29)
C.2. Collusive Equilibrium
piMi (t) =
1
N
max
Q
P (Q; t)qi − C(qi) = max
Q
(a(t)−Q)Q− cQ (C–30)
The First Order Necessary Condition;
a(t)−Q−Q− c = 0 (C–31)
Therefore;
Q =
a(t)− c
2
and qM =
a(t)− c
2N
(C–32)
The absolute margins for the industry is;
P − c = a(t)−Q− c = a(t)− c− a(t)− c
2
=
a(t)− c
2
(C–33)
As such, the collusive profits for each firms are;
piMi (t) =
(a(t)− c)
4N
(C–34)
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C.3. Defection Profits
piDi (t) = max
qi
P
(
qi + (N − 1)qM ; t) qi − C(qi)
= max
qi
(
a(t)− qi − (N − 1)qM
)
qi − cqi
(C–35)
The First Order Necessary Condition;
a(t)− qi − (N − 1)qM − qi − c = 0 (C–36)
Substituting in the value of qM ;
a(t)− qi − (N − 1)a(t)− c
2N
− qi − c = 0 (C–37)
Solving the First Order Condition;
qi =
(a(t)− c)(N + 1)
4N
(C–38)
Solving for total output;
Q = qi + (N − 1)qM = (a(t)− c)(N + 1)
4N
+ (N − 1)a(t)− c
2N
=
(a(t)− c)(3N − 1)
4N
(C–39)
Solving for absolute margins;
P − c = a(t)− c−Q = a(t)− c− (a(t)− c)(3N − 1)
4N
=
(a(t)− c) (N + 1)
4N
(C–40)
Thus,
piDi (t) = (P − c)qi =
(a(t)− c)2 (N + 1)2
16N2
(C–41)
C.4. Geometric Series with Repeating Elements
Let’s suppose that within a geometric series there are elements that repeat themselves every
t periods. We can view each repeated iteration as a unique element repeated every t periods.
Let’s consider the example of repeated Nash profits every t = 3 periods. The value of
perpetual competition can be expressed as follows;
V Ni (t) =
∞∑
j=0
δjpiNi (t+ i) = pi
N
i (t) + δpi
N
i (t+ 1) + δ
2piNi (t+ 2) + δ
3piNi (t)
+ δ4piNi (t+ 1) + δ
5piNi (t+ 2) + . . .
=
[
piNi (t) + δpi
N
i (t+ 1) + δ
2piNi (t+ 2)
]
+ δ3
[
piNi (t) + δpi
N
i (t+ 1) + δ
2piNi (t+ 2)
]
+ . . .
(C–42)
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If we were to generalize this result, we can quickly see that ;
V Ni (t) =
∞∑
j=0
δjpiNi (t+ i) =
∞∑
i=0
δtj
[
piNi (t) + · · ·+ δt−1piNi (t+ t− 1)
]
(C–43)
Notice that the term in brackets is invariant over the subscript j;
V Ni (t) =
[
piNi (t) + · · ·+ δt−1piNi (t+ t− 1)
] ∞∑
j=0
δtj (C–44)
The summation collapses to an infinite geometric series of the form;
V Ni (t) =
[
piNi (t) + · · ·+ δt−1piNi (t+ t− 1)
]
1− δt (C–45)
We point out that the above result can be represented as follows;
V Ni (t) =
[
piNi (t) + · · ·+ δt−tpiNi (t) + δt−t+1piNi (1) + · · ·+ δt−1piNi (t− 1)
]
1− δt (C–46)
Or more compactly;
V Ni (t) =
[
piNi (t) + · · ·+ δt−1piNi (t− 1)
]
1− δt (C–47)
C.5. Difference In Profits
First we consider piMi (t)− piNi (t);
piMi (t)− piNi (t) =
(a(t)− c)2
4N
− (a(t)− c)
2
(N + 1)2
= (a(t)− c)2 (N + 1)
2 − 4N
4N(N + 1)2
=
(a(t)− c)2(N − 1)2
4N(N + 1)2
(C–48)
Next we consider piDi (t)− piMi (t);
piDi (t)− piMi (t) =
(a(t)− c)2(N + 1)2
16N2
− (a(t)− c)
2
4N
= (a(t)− c)2 4N(N + 1)
2 − 16N2
4N16N2
=
(a(t)− c)24N(N − 1)2
4N16N2
=
(a(t)− c)2(N − 1)2
16N2
(C–49)
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D. Regression Results
Table 5: Negative Binomial Regression Results - All Filings (1970-2016)
Dependent variable:
Frequency of Filings (All)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CY CLE 0.169∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗ 0.042∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.024) (0.024)
Detrended Budget (M - 2010) 0.057∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗
(0.017) (0.016)
Leniency 1.208∗∗∗ 1.189∗∗∗
(0.130) (0.130)
Constant 1.13∗∗∗ 1.249∗∗∗ 1.177∗∗∗ 1.256∗∗∗
(0.230) (0.224) (0.176) (0.179)
Observations 182 182 182 182
α (LR Test α = 0) 0.584∗∗∗ 0.561∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗
Wald χ2 39.52∗∗∗ 60.25∗∗∗ 147.26∗∗∗ 156.96∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.024 0.030 0.103 0.107
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis.
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Table 6: Negative Binomial Regression Results - AA Filings - NBER (1970-2016)
Dependent variable:
Frequency of Filings
All All Collusion Collusion
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Expansion (=1) 0.316∗ 0.060 0.378∗∗ 0.075
(0.165) (0.115) (0.165) (0.151)
Detrended Budget (M - 2010) 0.069∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.015) (0.023) (0.019)
Leniency 1.268∗∗∗ 1.239∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.145)
Constant 2.069∗∗∗ 1.462∗∗∗ 1.512∗∗∗ 0.967∗∗∗
(0.152) (0.108) (0.146) (0.143)
Observations 188 188 182 188
α (LR Test α = 0) 0.635∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗ 0.839∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗∗
Wald χ2 17.35∗∗∗ 161.24∗∗∗ 13.07∗∗∗ 90.25∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.009 0.106 0.008 0.079
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis.
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E. Other Figures
Table 7: Frequency of Filings by Type Across Years (1970-2016)
All Fillings Collusion Related Merger Related
1970-1974 143.00 109.00 33.00
1975-1979 83.00 59.00 18.00
1980-1984 90.00 57.00 31.00
1985-1989 50.00 16.00 22.00
1990-1994 95.00 48.00 24.00
1995-1999 385.00 259.00 70.00
2000-2004 297.00 166.00 43.00
2005-2009 310.00 145.00 41.00
2010-2014 424.00 280.00 50.00
2015-2016∗ 124.00 71.00 27.00
∗ Only a two year period
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Table 8: Conditional Descriptive Statistics (1970-2016)
N Mean Median Sd
Expansion
Filing Frequency 162 10.96 9.00 9.25
Filing Frequency (Collusion) 162 6.67 5.00 6.84
Filing Frequency (Mergers) 162 1.94 2.00 1.83
Real Budget Appropriations (M - 2010) 162 26.25 22.78 9.52
Corporate Profits (B - 2010) 162 787.91 579.53 490.96
Corporate Profits/GDP 156 6.93 6.44 2.09
Contraction
Filing Frequency 26 8.69 6.50 7.17
Filing Frequency (Collusion) 26 5.00 4.00 3.82
Filing Frequency (Mergers) 26 1.73 1.00 1.87
Real Budget Appropriations (M - 2010) 26 23.30 21.49 10.61
Real Corporate Profits (B - 2010) 26 596.62 428.54 359.45
Corporate Profits/GDP 26 6.48 6.27 1.43
Table 9: Conditional Descriptive Statistics (1970-2016)
N Mean Median Sd
Pre-Revised Leniency Program (1993)
Filing Frequency 92 4.49 3.00 4.39
Filing Frequency (Collusion) 92 2.80 2.00 3.37
Filing Frequency (Mergers) 92 1.29 1.00 1.47
Post-Revised Leniency Program (1993)
Filing Frequency 96 16.54 15.00 8.33
Filing Frequency (Collusion) 96 9.92 8.00 6.93
Filing Frequency (Mergers) 96 2.50 2.00 1.95
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F. Simulation Details
F.1. Competition
As calculated in Section 2.1, the profits from competition are as follows;
piNi (t) =
(
cos
(
2pi(t−1)
t¯
)
− 1
)2
(N + 1)2
(F–50)
Using the estimated parameters we plot competitive profits in Figure 8. As we can see,
competitive profits track the periodic pattern embedded in the demand shifter a(t). Profits
peak when t = 10.5 and are at their lowest when t = 1. These extrema repeat every 19
periods. We plot the value of the competitive strategy in Figure 9. We find that competitive
value is periodic, however, it does not track the same pattern embedded in a(t). In fact, the
maximum value occurs at approximately t = 7.1 (and every 19 periods after). The maximum
value does not occur at t = 10.5 since future profits are discounted by δ. The discount factor
causes value to peak before demand. This offset is increasing in δ. As δ → 0, the offset
disappears.
Figure 8: Competitive Profits Over the Cycle (t¯ = 19)
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Figure 9: Value from Competition Over the Cycle (t¯ = 19)
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F.2. Cartel Profits
As derived in Section 2.2, the profits from forming a cartel are as follows;
piMi (t) =
(
cos
(
2pi(t−1)
t¯
)
− 1
)2
4N
(F–51)
We plot both the profit from collusion and the profit from competition in Figure 10. Collusive
profits track the periodic trend in the demand shifter a(t). In addition, profits peak when
t = 10.5 and are at their lowest when t = 1, repeating this pattern every 19 periods. We
observe that the difference between collusive profits and competitive profits is increasing
during an expansion and decreasing during a contraction. Assuming that there is no AA,
we plot the value from forming a cartel and the value from competition in Figure 11.
Figure 10: Collusive Profits Over the Cycle (t¯ = 19)
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Figure 11: Collusive Value Over the Cycle (t¯ = 19)
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Notice that the value from forming a cartel is large relative to the competitive strategy. This
is the case because we used a high discount factor. As per the Folk Theorem, in infinitely
repeated games we know that a strategy can be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium
as long as firms are sufficiently patient. In our model, firms are almost perfectly patient
in the sense that they are willing to trade current cash flows for future cash flows on a
one-to-one basis. Since patience alone is not enough to prevent the formation of cartels,
the fine imposed by the judicial authority can lower the value of collusion, thus leading to
a result where the gain from collusion may be negative at various points over the business
cycle.
F.3. Defection Profits
As derived in Section 2.2, the profits from defection are expressed as follows;
piDi (t) =
(
cos
(
2pi(t−1)
T
)
− 1
)2
(N + 1)2
16N2
(F–52)
We plot the profits from collusion versus the profits from defection in Figure 12. As can
be seen, the profit from defection is at least as great as the profits from continuing to
collude. In addition, profits peak when t = 10.5 and are at their lowest when t = 1. These
extrema repeat every 19 periods. We observe that the difference between defection profits
and collusive profits is increasing during an expansion and decreasing during a contraction.
Assume that there is no AA, we plot the value from defection and collusion in Figure 13.
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Figure 12: Defection Profits Over the Cycle (t¯ = 19)
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Figure 13: Value From Defection Over the Cycle (t¯ = 19)
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F.4. Simulated Economy
We simulate an economy with 20 identical markets over 80 quarters. We assume that
marginal costs are equal to zero, the length of the business cycle is 19 quarters, the proba-
bility of an investigation is 2%, and the probability of conviction is 50%. The size of each
market is drawn from a discrete uniform distribution over the support 2 to 20. Additionally,
the fine is drawn from a continuous uniform distribution over the support 0 to 5. The choice
of distribution and upper bounds are arbitrary and have no impact on the pattern observed
in the data. At each period, we determine if a competitive market forms a cartel. If a cartel
has already been formed, we determine if the cartel will collapse. We perform this simulation
10,000 times and take the average number of cartels across all simulations. Our results are
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plotted in Figure 14 below.
Figure 14: Simulation Results
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We find that the level of collusive behaviour tracks the business cycle. The highest level of
collusive behaviour occurs during the expansion while the lowest level occurs in a contraction.
We conclude that, even when the number of firms is random, we should still expect to observe
a cyclical pattern in overall collusive behaviour.
45
